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Contributory Infringement Liability in
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.:
"The One and Only" Pays for Our Sins
INTRODUCTION

The introduction of Sony Corporation's Betamax videocassette
recorders in November of 19751 has proved a mixed blessing for
owners of film copyrights and distributors of audiovisual materials. On the one hand, the Betamax and similar machines marketed by Sony's competitors have opened up previously unknown
markets for the sale and rental of films on videocassettes. 2 On the
other hand, the ability of these videocassette recorders (VCRs) to
record television programs off the air threatens to destroy the
value of copyrights held by television program producers and
3
distributors.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.,4 often referred to
as the Betamax case, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney
Productions joined in suing Sony Corporation for infringing their
copyrighted materials through the recording of programs off the
air on Sony Betamax VCRs. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that off-the-air recording constituted infringement and that
Sony was liable for contributory copyright infringement.5 In so
holding, the court expanded the existing doctrine of contributory
infringement of copyright. 6

1. Plaintiffs Preliminary Pre-Trial Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 4, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., No CV76-3560-F (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 11, 1976).
2. These markets have proven quite lucrative. In order to capture a greater segment of
these markets, various film distributors have changed their marketing strategies so as to
control and benefit more from videocassette rentals. See, e.g., Saved by the Numbers -A few
handy stats for the home revolution,TIME, Dec. 14, 1981, at 58 [hereinafter cited as Saved by
the Numbers].
3. Citing predictions that 20,000,000 homes will have VCRs by 1986, Warner Home
Video President, Mort Fink, said, "[Wlhen 20,000,000 or more VCR's are in place, any
feature film that appears on television will lose much of its future commercial value to the
copyright holder because, overnight, millions of copies can be made." Daily Variety, Jan. 6,
1982, at 4, col. 2.
4. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd and remanded,659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982). The case is often referred to as the Betamax case.
5. 659 F.2d at 976.
6. The court of appeals' finding that off-the-air taping constituted infringement promp-
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This article is limited to a discussion of Sony's liability for contributory infringement.7 The history of contributory copyright
infringement will be reviewed to place the Betamax case in the
context of the development of contributory infringement liability.
Then, the definition of contributory infringement of copyright will
be examined in its component parts and applied to Sony's conduct
in this case.8
BACKGROUND

Copyright and ContributoryInfringement
Copyright infringement is a tort.9 Liability, however, is not
limited to parties who perform, reproduce, or display a copyrighted
work in violation of the copyright. All who unite in an infringement are responsible for damages resulting from the infringement. 10
Liability for infringement of parties who have not directly
engaged in the infringing acts derives from tort principles of joint
and several liability.1' Initially, liability was imposed on parties
ted a flurry of congressional action which may, in effect, overturn the court's decision and
create an exemption for home videotaping from liability for copyright infringement. Four
bills which would create exceptions for home videotaping to the exclusive rights granted to
copyright holders under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§101-810 (1976), were introduced
shortly after the court of appeals' decision was reported. See H.R. 5488, H.R. 5705, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which would impose a fixed royalty upon the sale of all videotapes

and VCRs.
The bills in Congress would not, however, affect the Court's expansion of contributory
infringement liability as they do not deal with contributory infringement at all. The bills do
not seek to resolve the Betamax case itself by legislation. Instead, they handle the problem
by removing the underlying, direct infringement without which there can be no contributory infringement. See infra notes 53, 71 and accompanying text.
7. The court of appeals addressed neither Sony's possible liability for direct infringement nor Sony's possible vicarious liability. Since neither theory formed the basis of Sony's
liability, and both can be easily dismissed, they will not be covered in this article.
8. It is assumed throughout the article that off-the-air videotaping constitutes copyright
infringement.
9. See Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329,1337 (5th Cir. 1973) (in deciding that publication of Lee Harvey Oswald's writings in the Warren Commission Report infringed Oswald's
copy-rights and did not constitute a taking of property, the court stated, "it has always been held
that infringement of copyright, whether common law ...

or statutory,...

constitutes a

tort."); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1943) ("Since infringement is a
tort,..."); Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751,754 (2d Cir. 1923) ("Courts have long
recognized that infringement of a copyright is a tort ....
).
10. Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1916) (defendant held liable
even though he made no profit from another's sale of infringing photograph).
11. See, e.g., Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943) (entertainment hall
owner held severally liable with performer for copyright infringement when performer,
hired by the hall owner, performed copyrighted song without license); Ted Browne Music
Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751,754 (2d Cir. 1923) ("Courts have long recognized that... all persons
concerned [in infringement of copyright] are jointly and severally liable as such joint
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not directly participating in the infringing activities under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.12 Masters were made liable for
the infringing acts of their servants. Later, liability was imposed
on parties for the infringing acts of independent contractors under
13
certain circumstances.
Vicarious liability for infringing acts developed next. 14 Parties
were held vicariously liable for the acts of a direct infringer if they
had the right and ability to regulate the activity of the infringer
plus a direct financial interest in such activity. Liability would
attach despite the lack of an employment relationship between the
infringer and the party held vicariously liable. 15 Knowledge of the
infringing activity is not an element of vicarious liability. 16
The most recent development in copyright infringement liability
is contributory infringement. The doctrine of contributory infringement of copyright deals with parties ancillary and implemental to the infringement. As with vicarious liability and liability under respondeat superior, the party upon whom liability is
imposed is not directly involved in the infringing activity. Unlike
vicarious liability and respondeat superior, however, liability is
not imposed for contributory infringement solely on the basis of
the party's relationship to the infringer, but rather primarily on
the basis of the party's relationship to the infringement. 1 7 The
contributory infringer does not perform, reproduce, or exhibit the
tort-feasors.").
12. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971), discussed infra at notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g.,Dreamland Ballroom, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1929); M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass.
1960) (proprietors of dance halls held liable for infringing performances of orchestras hired
as independent contractors).
14. See, e.g., Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1977) (owner of public
restaurant and bar held liable for infringing performances of band hired to entertain restaurant patrons, even though the owner neither selected the music nor knew it was copyrighted). See also Gershwin Publishing Co. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
15. Gershwin Publishing,443 F.2d at 1162; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (liability imposed when right and ability to supervise
coalesce with a direct financial interest in the infringement of copyright).
16. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963)
(store owner held vicariously liable for infringing sales of record concessionaire even though
store owner did not know records contained infringing material); Boz Scaggs Music v. KND
Corp.,491 F. Supp. 908 (D. Conn.1980) (general manager/vice president of radio station held
vicariously liable for infringing selections played over the radio even though he did not
know about the infringement).
17. Since vicarious liability is imposed whenever there is a relationship consisting of
control and financial interest, and liability under respondeat superioris imposed whenever
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copyrighted work, nor control the direct infringer. Policy considerations, nevertheless, dictate the imposition of liability. 18
Contributory infringement is not defined in the Copyright Act
as it is in the Patent Act. 19 Thus, a judicial definition of contributory copyright infringement has evolved. The definition is most
clearly stated in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc.:20 "[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another may be held liable as a 'contribu21
tory' infringer."
ContributoryInfringement Case Law
Case law on contributory copyright infringement prior to the
Betamax case consisted essentially of four cases: 22 Universal Picthere is a master-servant relationship, liability is based solely on the relationship between
direct infringer and party liable. In most cases of vicarious liability and liability under
respondeat superior, the party liable did nothing to aid the infringement. See cases cited
supra notes 11-16.
In cases of contributory infringement liability, the party liable has contributed to the
infringement and by his contribution has become liable. As discussed later in the article,
there has been a relationship between the direct and contributory infringers in previous
cases, but it has been the activities of the contributor which formed the basis of the liability
and not the relationship. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
18. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d at 307 ("the purposes of
the copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary
of [the] exploitation [of copyrighted materials]").
19. The Copyright Act only defines an infringer, 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976), whereas the
Patent Act defines a contributory infringer of patents:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 2 71(cX1976).
It is important to remember that patent law and copyright law are different. Although
there are some similarities between the two areas, they are covered by entirely separate
titles in the United States Code. Because the nature of the rights and subject matter protected by copyright and patent laws differ, reasoning in copyright cases is not always
applicable to patent cases, and vice versa, although such reasoning from one area is sometimes persuasive in the other. See infra note 104.
20. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). The Gershwin Publishing definition of contributory
copyright infringement has been adopted in several subsequent cases. See Stewart v.
Southern Music Distrib. Co., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 258,259 (M.D. Fla. 1980), F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd. v. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978), as
well as both the district court and appeals court decisions in the Betamax case.
21. 443 F.2d at 1162.
22. Other cases in which liability has been imposed on parties other than the direct
infringer are more properly classified as cases of vicarious liability, that is, where the party
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tures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Corp.,23 Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,24 Gershwin Publishing Corp.
v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 25 and Johnson v. Salomon.26 In all four cases, the contributory infringer, although not
directly involved in the infringing activity, aided the infringement
in some way.
In the 1947 case, Universal Pictures Co., Inc. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp.,27 an individual defendant, Clyde Bruckman, had written a
script for Universal for the movie, "So's Your Uncle," containing a
comedy routine virtually identical to one in an earlier Harold
Lloyd film, "Movie Crazy. '28 Bruckman had worked on the earlier
movie and later suggested to the producers at Universal that they
29
use the routine in their movie.
Bruckman attempted to escape all liability for the infringement,
claiming that, although he knew he had copied the material, he
had told the other defendants of his copying and had not participated in the production, release, or exhibition of the infringing
movie. 30 Bruckman could not be held liable for the infringement
under the theory of vicarious liability because he did not have the
right or ability to control the infringing activity. The court, however, refused to excuse Bruckman, finding that one who contributes to the infringement is liable with the direct infringer. The
court found that Bruckman had contributed to the infringement
by supplying the script which described the infringing comedy
31
routine.

held liable has the right and ability to control the infringing activity and receives a direct
financial benefit from such activity. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 3304 (2d Cir. 1963); Rexnord, Inc. v. Modem Handling Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190
(D. Del. 1974) (on denial of motion for summary judgment, the court found that defendant
company could be held liable for infringing catalog printed for it, even though it directed the
printer not to copy copyrighted catalog supplied to printer by defendant. The court found
that the defendant had the ability to control the printer and received a direct financial
benefit from the printing and distribution of the infringing catalog).
23. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
24. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), enforced, 327 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453
F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972).
25. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
26. 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (D. Minn. 1977).
27. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
28. The comedy routine involved the hero mistakenly donning a magician's coat. Id. at
358.
29. Id. at 365.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,32
decided almost twenty years after the Harold Lloyd case, involved
the contribution of an advertising agency, two radio stations, and a
service corporation to the infringing activity of a fly-by-night
record manufacturer. The record manufacturer had included four
of the plaintiffs' copyrighted compositions on a record without
obtaining licenses. The plaintiffs attempted to serve and bring suit
against this record "pirate," but because the record pirate had
since disappeared without a trace, the plaintiffs sought to recover
from the parties who had helped the record pirate effect his
33
scheme.
The plaintiffs contended that the advertising agency knew or
should have known that Mark-Fi Records was a record pirate from
its method of operation. 34 Further, plaintiffs contended that both
the ad agency and the service company which had been hired to
package and ship the infringing records knew or should have
known of Mark-Fi's piracy from the records' low price. 35 In denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court
found that whether the defendants had actual or constructive
knowledge raised a question of fact and held that, if such knowledge were shown, the defendants could be held jointly liable with
36
the record pirate.
At trial, the evidence showed that an employee of the ad agency
was an active participant in the record piracy scheme. The
employee's knowledge was attributed to the agency, and the
agency was held liable, in essence, under respondeat superior.37
The other defendants settled out of court (admitting, however, no
liability for infringement). 38 Thus, the court was foreclosed from
considering whether constructive knowledge of the piracy/infringement would have been sufficient to hold the ad agency or the other
defendants contributorily liable.
The defendant in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
32.
33.
34.

256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 401, 403.
Id. at 404.

35.
36.

Id.
Id.

37. 327 F. Supp. 788, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Professor Nimmer has surmised that liability
was imposed in this case due "to the difficulty then faced by many copyright proprietors in
bringing to account fly-by-night record pirates .... " M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§12.04[A](1981).
38. 327 F. Supp. at 792.
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Artists Management,Inc.,39 CAMI, performed booking and management services for its artist-clients. CAMI also sought new
markets for the artists and helped local communities establish
40
entertainment programs in which its clients would perform.
CAMI knew that the artists would be performing copyrighted
works. 41 Further, it knew that the artists were not obtaining
licenses to perform these works while failing itself to obtain the
42
licenses for the artists.
The court found CAMI vicariously liable for its clients' infringing activity because CAMI had the ability to control the artists'
activities plus the opportunity to receive direct financial benefit
from its clients' work. 43 The court went further, however. Besides
finding CAMI liable under a vicarious liability theory, the court
found that CAMI was liable for contributory infringement. 44 Although the court did not indicate whether CAMI's activities
induced, caused or materially contributed to the infringement, it
seemed to base its finding of liability on the fact that CAMI knew
of the infringing acts and participated in the overall business venture which encompassed the infringement, just as the ad agency
45
had in Screen Gems.
Finally, in the 1977 case Johnson v. Salomon,46 defendant
Salomon claimed to be acting as an independent sales representative. He claimed that he merely solicited, arranged and provided
support for the sales of a 3-D chess set and rule book, which plaintiff had copyrighted, but which were sold without a license from
the plaintiff. 47 Salomon was in fact much more deeply involved in
the infringing enterprise than merely selling the infringing items.
He told the other infringers that he had a license from the plaintiff, when he knew he did not. 48 He also misrepresented to the
plaintiff the true facts so that the plaintiff would not learn of the
infringing activity or take steps to stop it. Finally, Salomon not
only approved the printing of the infringing rule book, but appar39. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 1160-61.
41. The performers would supply CAMI with lists of the works they would be performing. CAMI would then have programs printed. Id. at 1161.
42. Id. at 1161, 1163.
43. Id. at 1162-63.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (D. Minn. 1977).
47. Id. at 803, 814.
48. Id. at 815.
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ently instigated the enterprise that resulted in the copyright
49
infringement.
Salomon was found contributorily liable for his involvement in
the enterprise, even though he had not directly participated in the
manufacture or actual sale of the infringing 3-D chess games and
rule books. The court held that his activities both induced the other
defendants to infringe and materially contributed to the success of
50
the infringing venture.
Several factors are common to all four cases. First, in each case,
the defendant(s) knew of the infringing activity. Second, they participated in the infringing enterprise, even though they did not
themselves directly infringe any copyrights. Their activities made
the infringement possible or enabled it to continue. Without the
aid of the contributory infringers, the infringement in these cases
would probably not have occurred or succeeded.
Third, a continuing relationship concerning the infringing
activities existed between the direct and the contributory infringers. The contributory infringers had direct contact with the infringer more than once during the course of the infringing enterprise;
business transactions between the parties were substantial. For
example, in Harold Lloyd, the direct infringer employed Bruckman to write the script which contained the infringing gags, and
in Gershwin Publishing, CAMI managed, or obtained bookings for, the performers, who then performed the copyrighted works without licenses. The contact between the direct and
contributory infringers was not informal, casual or indirect contact in or through the marketplace.
The first two factors are the principal components of the definition of contributory infringement as formulated in GershwinPublishing-knowledge and participation. Every case of contributory
infringement has contained these two factors. The third factor,
however, has not been incorporated into the definition, even
though a substantial relationship between the direct and contributory infringers has existed whenever the courts have found contributory infringement.
The potentially broad application of the Gershwin Publishing
definition to situations in which it would be undesirable to impose
liability could be limited by requiring as a factor such a relation-

49.
50.

Id. at 830.
Id.
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ship between direct and contributory infringers before imposing
liability. Thus, a seller of paper, for example, could not be held
liable if a purchaser used the paper in making infringing copies of
a copyrighted work, since their relationship would be limited to
and concerned only with the sale of the paper and not the production of the infringing copies.
In the absence of this third factor, liability might otherwise be
limited by an explanation of what constitutes inducing, causing,
or materially contributing to an infringement. None of the prior
cases, however, explains or defines the nature of these contributory infringement acts so as to facilitate its application to other
factual settings such as that presented in the Betamax case. Given
this lack of explanation, Sony's conduct in the Betamax case will
be evaluated by applying only the Gershwin Publishingtwo-factor
definition without reference to the third, direct-relationship factor.
THE BETAMAX CASE

Lower Court Disposition
The United States District Court for the Central District of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Gershwin Publishing definition to a different set
of facts in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.51 In that
case, Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions brought
suit in an attempt to preserve the value of their copyrights against
Sony Corporation, its American distributor, four retailers who sold
Betamax VCRs, Sony's advertising agency, and one individual.
The plaintiffs claimed that taping their programs off the air without a license constituted infringement of their copyrights. 5 2 They
further claimed that Sony and the other corporate defendants
were liable for direct and contributory infringement as well as
53
liable vicariously for the individual infringement.
Sony's participation in the copyright infringement consisted of
its advertising, manufacturing and sale of Betamax VCRs which

51. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
cert. granted,102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
52. 480 F. Supp. at 432.
53. Id. The parties stipulated that the individual defendant, a client of plaintiffs' attorneys, would not be held liable for damages. The joinder of an individual who had used a
Betamax machine to tape copyrighted programs off the air was necessary to establish direct
infringement. Liability for contributory infringement is based upon proof of direct infringement. Absent a finding of direct infringement, Sony could not have been held liable for
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are capable of taping television broadcasts off the air. 54 The district court held, inter alia,that Sony would not be liable as a direct
or contributory infringer and would not be liable for any infringes
ment practiced by individuals owning Betamax VCRs.5
Relying on the two-factor test established in Gershwin Publishing, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding Sony
contributorily liable for copyright infringement. After examining
these factors, knowledge and participation, the court concluded
that Sony intended Betamax machines to be used to record programs, most of which are copyrighted, off the air. Thus, Sony
knew the VCRs would be used to infringe copyrights.5 6 Sony's
advertising of Betamax machines extolled their ability to record
programs off the air. Additionally, Sony must have materially
contributed to such infringement because without a VCR it would
be impossible to record the copyrighted programs. In slightly different terms, Sony's substantial involvement in the infringing
57
enterprise was sufficient contribution to render Sony accountable.
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Gershwin Publishing
definition of contributory infringement was uncritical, mechanical, and unwarranted in this case. The Betamax case presents a
situation substantially different from previous cases of contributory copyright infringement. Sony is simply the manufacturer of a
machine that can be used to infringe. No manufacturer of such
machinery has ever been held contributorily liable for an infringement perpetrated with its machine.5 8 Sony has only an indirect
and limited business relationship with the direct infringers-the
users of Betamax VCRs. All previous cases involved regular and
contributory infringement. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
54. Sony Corporation manufactures and sells Betamax videocassette recorders. These
VCRs are composed of mainly two parts: the videocassette recorder component which
records television signals and the tuner component which translates broadcast television
signals into a form which can be recorded. The RF adapter mentioned by the district court is
only used during playback of recorded material, and is not involved in the infringing act of
videotaping off the air. 480 F. Supp. at 435.
55. 480 F. Supp. at 469.
56. 659 F.2d at 975.
57. Id. at 976.
58. None of the previous cases of contributory infringement involved a claim that the
manufacturer of a machine contributed to the infringement by supplying the machine.
Even in cases of direct infringement, manufacturers of the instrumentality which produced
infringing copies have never been charged with liability or joined as defendants. As the
district court in the Betamax case noted, neither the maker of the film and cameras used to
produce the infringing Ben Hur movie in Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55 (1911),
nor the manufacturer of the Make-A-Tape machine involved in Elektra Records Co. v. Gem
Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), which made copies of copyrighted
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direct business relationships. In contrast, Sony merely advertised
and sold its VCRs to the general public. In no previous case of
contributory copyright infringement has advertising to the general public been found to constitute inducement.
FactorAnalysis
The facts of the Betamax case are crucial to a determination of
the nature of Sony's involvement or lack of involvement in the
infringement. This determination calls for a careful and reasoned
application of the Gershwin Publishing two-factor test. A closer
examination of these two factors, as applied to the Betamax case,

follows.
Knowledge
To be liable for contributory infringement, the defendant must
have knowledge of the infringing activity.5 9 The district court
argued that Sony lacked such knowledge for two reasons. First,
because it had no direct involvement or contact with Betamax
purchasers who had recorded programs, Sony had no direct
knowledge of infringing activity. 6 Second, it was an unsettled
question at the time whether off-the-air taping constituted copyright infringement. Thus, even if Sony had reason to know
Betamax machines would be used to tape programs off the air, it
"could not know that this was an infringing activity." 61

audio tapes, were even sued. 480 F. Supp. at 459.
59. Gershwin Publishing,443 F.2d at 1162; Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Mark-Fi
Records, 256 F. Supp. 399, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cf. 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary
Property § 95 (1939): "Guilty knowledge or intent is essential to liability for contributory
infringement...."
60. 480 F. Supp. at 460.
61. Id. The district court assumed that the knowledge requirement meant that the defendant had to know not only of the activity itself, but also of its infringing character. The
court of appeals argued that knowledge of the character of the activity is irrelevant since the
definition only requires "knowledge of the infringing activity," and since it is not necessary
to know that one is infringing to be liable for infringement. 659 F.2d at 975.
The definition of infringement, however, has no knowledge requirement (17 U.S.C. § 501
(1976)), while the definition of contributory infringement does. See Gershwin Publishing,443
F.2d at 1162, and supranote 59. In Screen Gems-ColumbiaMusic there was no question that

the ad agency knew the record pirate was selling records with the copyrighted songs on
them. The issue was whether the ad agency knew that selling the records infringed the
plaintiffs copyrights, i.e., whether the ad agency knew of the infringing character of the
sales. Thus, knowledge of the character of the activity would appear to be required.
In the Betamax case, however, Sony was aware of the infringing character of recording
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The court of appeals, however, ruled that Sony had sufficient
knowledge that Betamax VCRs would be used to record off the air
since "that is the most conspicuous use of the product." 62 The
court based its determination of Sony's knowledge merely on
Sony's expectation that Betamax VCRs would be used to make
these recordings. 63 The court did not characterize Sony's knowledge as "constructive," nevertheless, the court clearly did not
require that Sony have direct or actual knowledge to impose
liability.
The four precedents discussed above do not support the Ninth
Circuit's construction of the knowledge requirement. In three of the
four, the contributory infringers knew that no licenses had been
obtained. In Gershwin Publishing, CAMI had been told copyrighted works would be performed.6 4 In Johnson v. Salomon,
Salomon knowingly misrepresented to the other infringers that he
had a license for the 3-D chess game.6 5 In Harold Lloyd, Bruckman knew and told the other infringers that he had copied from
the earlier film. 66 Only in Screen Gems did the court intimate that
"reason to know" might satisfy the knowledge requirement
for
contributory infringement liability. 67 Even in that case, however,
the actual knowledge of the employee-imputed to the advertising
agency-formed the basis of the agency's liability.68
In all of the cases, liability was based on the actual knowledge of
the contributory infringers, not on constructive knowledge. If the
knowledge requirement was met by constructive knowledge, liability for contributory infringement might extend far beyond necessary limits. The manufacturer of a photocopying machine, for

copyrighted programs. On pre-Betamax VCRs, Sony had attached a warning, "This videotape recorder is not to be used to record copyrighted works," and, in the Betamax instruction
book, had warned, "Television programs, films, videotapes and other materials may be
copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material may be contrary to the provisions of
the United States copyright laws." 480 F. Supp. at 436. Sony clearly knew copying copyrighted works constituted infringement. It would be nonsensical and impractical to require
that Sony's knowledge of the infringing character of acts of copying in particular circumstances be confirmed by a court finding, which is what the district court appears to have
required.
62. 659 F.2d at 975.
63. Id.
64. 443 F.2d at 1161. The court implied, however, that "reason to know" might be sufficient. Id. at 1162.
65. 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 815.
66. 162 F.2d at 366.
67. 256 F. Supp. at 404.
68. 327 F. Supp. at 792.
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example, might be held liable for infringing uses of a machine it
sold if aware of the press's possible infringing uses. To hold a party
liable in such cases because of what he should have known might
"block the wheels of commerce. '6 9 Manufacturers would not introduce new products if they feared liability for contributory infringement due to this type of constructive knowledge.
A finding of knowledge of infringing activity need not be based
only on Sony's expectations and reasonable conclusions regarding
the use of VCRs, however. Sony, in fact, had actual knowledge. An
independent survey conducted for the defendants in 1978 showed
that ninety-six percent of the Betamax owners had recorded programs on the VCRs for time shifting purposes. 70 Sony knew of the
survey content because it introduced the survey as evidence at
trial. Even if Sony's trial counsel had withheld the survey results
from the corporation, Sony would likely have been stopped from
denying it had actual knowledge of Betamax usage on agency
principles. Thus, the court of appeals could have found that Sony
had knowledge of infringement without adopting an unnecessarily broad, constructive knowledge standard.
Even though Sony knew someone was using Betamax VCRs to
infringe copyrights, the question remains whether Sony had to
know of a particular infringer's activities. Because liability for con7 1
tributory infringement is based on acts of direct infringement,

69. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912). The A.B. Dick case involved a patented
mimeograph machine sold with a license restriction limiting the machine's use to operation
only with nonpatented materials supplied by the patent licensor. Use of the machine with
materials not supplied by the licensor violated the license and amounted to infringement.
The Court considered whether the supplier of mimeograph ink contributorily infringed the
patent. The Court suggested limits to contributory infringement liability, stating: "Undoubtedly a bare supposition that by a sale of an article which though adapted to an infringing
use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a contributory
infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of commerce." 224 U.S. at 48. The limited
monopolies of patent and copyright grants are intended to advance the public welfare.
Thus, such grants must end when they act to halt commerce, and thereby interfere with the
public welfare. The Court found, however, that the supplier of ink made the sale "with the
purpose and intent that it would be ... used" in an infringing way, and was therefore liable
for contributory infringement. Id. at 49.
70. 480 F. Supp. at 438. Time shifting is the practice of recording programs off the air
either while watching other programs or while not watching television at all to be able to
view the recorded program at another, more convenient time. A recent study by Field
Research Corporation shows that 75% of all VCR use is for time shifting. Saved by the
Numbers, supra note 2, at 58.
71. Logically, there must be a direct infringement to contribute to. Accord cases in the
patent field: Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) ("But it is
established that there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a
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failure to prove the latter precludes a finding of the former. Thus,
the question is whether the knowledge required must be of a
proven act of direct infringement, or, in the Betamax case, whether
Sony had to know of the infringing acts of William Griffiths, the
individual defendant, or of the witnesses. Where there is a direct
and substantial relationship between the direct and contributory
infringers, as in the previous cases on contributory infringement,
the problem does not arise. In the Betamax case, however, there
are thousands of potential infringers, and Sony would not be actually aware of any one in particular.
The district court assumed that Sony had to have knowledge of
the individual, direct infringer's activity or at least of the acts of
infringement proven to the court, such as those acts of the witnesses.7 2 Thus, Sony's knowledge that infringement was being
practiced somewhere by someone 73 would be irrelevant. Since
Sony had no direct contact with Betamax users in general, nor
with the individual defendant or witnesses in particular, Sony
could not have the requisite knowledge for liability.
The court of appeals, however, made the contrary assumption
that Sony only had to know that someone was using Betamax
VCRs for infringing purposes; 74 whether Sony knew that the
other defendants or the witnesses used Betamax VCRs to infringe
was irrelevant. This assumption is, in part, supported by the
Gershwin Publishing case. In that case, none of the individual
artists, the direct infringers, were before the court, but CAMI, the
booking agency, was still found liable for contributory infringement.75 If the purpose of requiring knowledge of the infringement
is, in part, to protect from liability those parties who inadvertently
aid an infringement, requiring the direct infringer to be before the
court would neither help nor hinder this purpose since the contributory infringer would have knowingly aided the acts of infringement in any event. Sony's knowledge, then, need not have been of
the defendant's or witnesses' infringement.

direct infringement"); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In a word, if there is no infringement of a patent there can be

no contributory infringement.").
72. 480 F. Supp. at 459.60.
73. This would be so even if 96%of all Betamax owners practiced infringement.
74. 659 F.2d at 975.
75. It should be noted, however, that in GershwinPublishing the contributory infringer,
CAMI, was also vicariously liable. Under vicarious liability, the defendant need not be
aware of any infringing activity, and may be held liable even if the infringing activity is
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Sony knew, or at the very least could be estopped from denying it
knew, that Betamax VCRs were being used to record copyrighted
programs. Its knowledge was sufficient to render it liable if the
other requirements for liability were met. The court of appeals
reached the right decision in finding Sony had the requisite
knowledge, but in doing so used an unnecessarily broad construction of the knowledge requirement. 76
Participation
Once knowledge of the infringing activity is shown, the contributory infringer must be shown to have participated in the infringement either by inducing, i.e., persuading or influencing, the direct
infringer to infringe, or by materially contributing to the in7
fringment.7
1. Inducement
The district court concluded that neither the individual defendant nor any of the individual witnesses had been induced to
infringe copyrights.7 8 There was no evidence that they had been
influenced or encouraged by Sony's advertisements. 79 The court of
appeals, however, found that Sony had participated in infringement, but did not specify whether Sony had induced the infringing
activity or had materially contributed to it.8° The court merely
stated that "[tlhere can be no doubt that the corporate appellees
meet [the Gershwin Publishing] definition" 8' of contributory in-

performed against the defendant's orders. See Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Sys., Inc.,
379 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (D. Del. 1974).
76. In support of its conclusion that the knowledge requirement was satisfied, the court
stated, "The record establishes that appellees knew and expected that Betamax's major use
would be to record copyrighted programs off-the-air." (emphasis supplied). 659 F.2d at 975.
The statement suggests that Sony's expectation is relevant to a determination of Sony's
knowledge of infringement and that Sony need not have actual knowledge of actual infringement. In all previous cases, the knowledge was not of potential infringement, but of actual
infringement.
77. "Causes" has not been included as one of the components of participation since it is
a nebulous word with myriad, different legal meanings. None of the cases specifically
discusses "causes" in the context of contributory copyright infringement. Any conduct
which might cause the infringement could probably be characterized as inducement or
material contribution anyway.
78. 480 F. Supp. at 460.
79. Id.
80. 659 F.2d at 975-76.
81. Id. at 975.
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fringers, and that "corporate appellees are sufficiently engaged in
82
the enterprise to be held accountable."
Plaintiffs' claims that Sony's advertising constituted induce8 3
ment are, to use the district court's word, "unprecedented."
Never before has a defendant been held liable for merely advertising a product which may be used to infringe copyrights. Arguably,
if Sony's advertisements planted in some consumers the idea of
buying Betamax VCRs to record copyrighted programs, then Sony
at least minimally induced any recordation which was actually
84
made.
It is not clear from the cases, however, whether the requirement
of inducement is so easily met. In Johnson v. Salomon, defendant
Salomon not only suggested to the other defendants the idea of
manufacturing and selling the infringing chess games and rule
books, but also instigated the entire enterprise.8 5 Johnson, however, is a gross case of inducement and provides little guidance for
the less clear Betamax case.
On the one hand, contributory copyright infringement liability
has previously only been based on obvious inducement directed to
the infringer,8 6 and never on advertising to the general public. On
the other hand, no court has held that advertising does not constitute inducement to infringe copyright. Thus, it is an open question
whether advertising to the general public is sufficient inducement
for liability to attach.
In the area of patent law, as in copyright law, the active inducement of infringement creates liability for the infringement. 7 To
incur liability for inducement, a defendant must actively aid or
abet actual infringement.8 8 Liability for inducing patent infringement, however, is different from liability for contributory patent
infringement. One who sells a component of a patented invention
with knowledge that it has been especially made for use in infringing the patent will not incur liability for inducing infringement,

82. Id. at 976.
83. 480 F. Supp. at 460.
84. See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v.Sony Corp.: "FairUse" Looks Different on
Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1980).
85. 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 818 (D. Minn. 1977).
86. Id.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1976) provides: "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer."
88. E.g., by instructing a purchaser how to use the item in the patented combination. P.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §17.02[2] (1980).
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even though such a sale literally induces the infringement.8 9 Nevertheless, the patent cases provide some guidance on what constitutes inducement.
Advertising which may in effect instruct users of a product how
to use it to infringe a method patent was held not to constitute
inducement in PlasteringDevelopment Center, Inc. v. PermaGlasMesh Corp.9 0 In that case, the court found that defendant's literature, which portrayed a plasterer applying defendant's fiberglass
tape according to the patented method, did not induce infringement. The court stated that the defendant would be held liable only
if the plaintiffs showed that the defendant had "encouraged others
through its literature, to take each and every step of the method.... "91
The court concluded that "the mere sale of the [product] is not
inducement to infringe the patent in issue, and the picture [suggesting its use in the patented method] in-and-of-itself does not
induce a purchaser to infringe the method patent of plaintiff. '92
Thus, more than a suggestion that the product may be used in an
infringing manner is required to constitute inducement.
Under this standard of inducement, Sony did not induce purchasers of Betamax VCRs to infringe copyrights. Sony's advertising suggested that the Betamax machines could be used to record
programs which may or may not be copyrighted. Consumers have
purchased VCRs for their ability to record programs off the air, 93
but it is clear that Sony's advertising did not instigate the practice. 94
Sony's advertising of its VCRs would not "in-and-of-itself...
induce a purchaser to infringe ... 95
On the other hand, Sony did induce copyright infringement
under the standard of inducement employed by the Second Circuit
in Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,96 a contributory

89. Id.
90. 371 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ohio 1973); but cf. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (inducement found where manufacturer demonstrated
use of infringing product to distributors, intended infringing use of product was readily
apparent, and there was no substantial non-infringing use of product).
91. 371 F. Supp. at 950.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 70.
94. Indeed, the individual defendant, William Griffiths testified that he started recording programs off the air one to two years before Sony began marketing the Betamax VCRs.
480 F. Supp. at 436. One witness, Marc Wielage, testified that he also recorded programs off
the air using pre-Betamax equipment. Id. at 437.
95. Plastering Dev. Center, Inc. v. Perma Glas-Mesh Corp., 371 F. Supp. 939, 950 (N.D.
Ohio 1973).
96. 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979).
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trademark infringement case. The court argued that participation
in the infringement such as placing an infringing and misleading
label on articles before delivering them to the retailer, was not
necessary for contributory liability.
[A] manufacturer or wholesaler would be liable under §32
[of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1976)] if he suggested,
even if only by implication, that a retailer fill a bottle with
the generic capsules and apply [plaintiff's] mark to the
label, or continued to sell capsules containing the generic
drug which facilitated this to a druggist whom he knew or
had reason to know was engaging in the practices just
97
described.
The contributory infringer's mere suggestion to infringe to the
direct infringer coupled with the sale of a product which facilitated
such infringement would appear to be sufficient inducement to
create contributory liability. Under such a broad standard, Sony
would be liable for contributory infringement. Sony's advertising
clearly suggested an infringing alternative to watching programs
at the time they are broadcast, an alternative many VCR purchasers may not have considered before seeing the advertising.
Cases in other areas of the law are of no further help in determining whether Sony's conduct constitutes inducement. It is easy
to say simply that "salesmanship is inducement, 9 8s and hold
Sony liable for advertising and marketing a product which may be
used to infringe copyrights. Such a low standard of inducement,
however, would greatly expand liability for contributory copyright
infringement.
Prior cases of contributory infringement do not mandate a low
standard for inducement since none involved inducement by general advertising. Clearly, basing liability upon such a low standard extends contributory infringement liability beyond the gross
case of inducement involved in Johnson v. Salomon. It may be
undesirable to extend liability to cases where the contributor has
merely suggested the infringement. Extensive contributory liability may "block the wheels of commerce," 99 causing manufacturers
not to sell items which may be used in infringing activities for fear

97. Id. at 636.
98. Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309,315, 112 A.2d 174,177 (1959) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting) (defendant convicted of inducing another to sell stocks in violation of Pennsyl-

vania Securities Act).
99.

Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).
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that their advertising and sale alone might induce copyright
infringement and lead to liability.
On the other hand, the cases do not mandate a high standard of
inducement. Indeed, it may well serve the policies behind the doctrine of contributory infringement to hold liable anyone who
knowingly encourages another in any way to infringe. A party
should not escape liability simply because he has been able to
entice someone else to perform the infringing acts for him in a
subtle, rather than gross, manner.
Sony's inducement to infringe in the Betamax case falls somewhere in between the two standards. Whether Sony should be held
liable for inducing infringement cannot be determined solely from
an application of the Gershwin Publishing definition of contributory infringement, and depends on other policy considerations
which determine which standard to use.
2. Material Contribution
Material contribution is the second category of participation. A
party who has helped an infringer in a more then minimal fashion
may be held liable for contributory infringement even though it
had not induced the infringement. 10 0 "Material contribution" however, is potentially a very broad category that might be interpreted
to include conduct which, for policy or other reasons, should not be
considered contributory infringement. For example, no court would
hold a power company liable for contributory infringement for
supplying the electricity which powers a printing press used to
make infringing copies of a book.
Material contribution does not, however, mean substantial contribution. Substantial contribution is a quantitative measure of the
contribution to infringement, i.e., how much the contributor helped
the infringer, while material contribution is a qualitative measure
of the contribution, i.e., the manner in which the contributor
helped the infringer. Thus, an assessment of the quality of the
contribution, not the quantity, is the basis of the proper test of
liability. 10 Previous cases of contributory copyright infringement
provide little or no instruction on how to assess the quality of the

100. E.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399

(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
101. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968),
where the Supreme Court stated, "mere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test
to determine copyright liability in the context of television broadcasting."
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contribution and give little guidance on what contribution is material in a case like the Betamax case.
The district court in the Betamax case pointed out that all conduct which helps the infringer pursue his unlawful activity technically contributes to the infringement. 10 2 Sony's contribution to the
infringing activity was, and is, the manufacture and sale of VCRs
capable of recording programs off the air. Without the sales of
Betamax and Sony's competitors' VCRs, approximately three million households 0 3 would not engage in,
copyright infringement. It
is difficult to deny that Sony's contribution to this mass copyright
infringement is substantial.
Although substantial, Sony's contribution may not be material,
however. In patent law, for example, the seller of a staple article of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use 0 4 is not liable for contributory infringement even if the article is used in an
infringing manner. 1 5 Applying this concept to the copyright context, a determination that a product is a staple article of commerce
which thereby excuses the seller from liability amounts to concluding that the contribution of the seller of the product is not material.
This conclusion is true in terms of practical outcome. A party
introduces an apparatus which makes an infringement possible,
knowing of its infringing uses. The party will be held liable for
contributory infringement if, inter alia, its conduct is deemed a
material contribution because the apparatus is a staple article of
commerce. Hence, the contribution must not be material, because a
material contribution would have led to liability.
The contribution should not be considered material for policy
reasons as well. The manufacturer of a staple article of commerce
may be aware of the infringing uses of his product, but does not
intend or expect that the product will be used to infringe. Whether
it is used to infringe is not the choice of the manufacturer, but of the
consumer. If the product may be used in a noninfringing manner,
an infringement is caused by the infringer's choice to use the product unlawfully and not by any inherent limitation in the product

102. 480 F. Supp. at 461.
103. This was the approximate number of households with VCRs at the time this article
was written. Saved by the Numbers, supra note 2, at 58.
104. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976).
105. See Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of Am., 166 F.2d 286, 295 (3d Cir. 1948)("it was and
still is the law that the sale of an article of commerce of ordinary use without relation to any
apparatus does not make the manufacturer guilty of contributory infringement if the buyer
later makes use of the article in an infringing apparatus.").
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itself. The manufacturer should not incur liability for a choice it
did not make. Such liability might deter manufacturers from selling products with possible infringing uses, making useful products
unavailable.
On the other hand, if the article does not have substantial noninfringing uses, then almost any use of it will cause it to be used in
an infringing manner. The choice of the user to infringe or not to
infringe will be inconsequential. The manufacturer will have made
the choice for the user. Thus, the sale of the article alone encourages the infringement; the sale with the intended use accomplishes
the infringement.
Applying this patent law concept to the Betamax case, the district court found the Betamax VCR to be a staple article of commerce, excusing the sellers from liability on the basis of that
determination.10 6 The district court acknowledged that Sony had
contributed to the infringements practiced by purchasers of
Betamax VCRs, but held that the contribution was not material
since VCRs were staple articles of commerce. 10 7 The court found
that VCRs had substantial noninfringing uses since they could be
106. 480 F. Supp. at 461. Patent law concepts are appropriate in this case for several
reasons. First, copyright and patent law both protect the exclusive right to exploit the
embodiment of ideas-Copyright law protects the idea as it is embodied in a literary, audiovisual, or other similar work, and patent law, as it is embodied in a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition. Second, copyright and patent law serve a similar goal, that is,
the encouragement of individual effort for the public benefit, by providing the incentive of a
limited grant of exclusive rights of exploitation. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954)("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts."').
Last, the contribution to infringement in this case is much more akin to the contribution
in patent infringement cases than in previous copyright cases. In patent cases, the contribution to the infringement consists' of providing material or an apparatus which makes it
possible to practice the patented process, or a component to manufacture the patented
article. In other words, the contribution is supplying an item which enables the infringer to
infringe, for example, the tape which enables the infringer to practice a patented method of
taping drywall or plaster joints.
In previous cases of contributory copyright infringement, the contribution has consisted
of providing a service of some kind, rather than goods, to the infringer, e.g., writing a script
in HaroldLloyd and providing booking and management services in Gershwin Publishing.
In the Betamax case, Sony contributed to the infringement by selling an apparatus-the
VCRs-which enabled the infringers to copy television programs off the air. Thus, the same
concept which allows the seller of an apparatus to escape liability for contributory infringement of a patent-the staple article of commerce-would be applicable to the Betamax case
as it would serve the same policy in a similar situation which is under copyright law instead
of patent law. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 88, at § 17.02; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1976).
107. See 480 F. Supp. at 461.
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used to record various kinds of uncopyrighted and uncopyrightable television programs, such as news, religious and sports
programs. 10
The court of appeals did not dispute the district court's application of the patent law concept of staple articles of commerce to
copyright law, but did not agree with the lower court's characterization of VCRs. 10 9 The court flatly asserted that Betamax VCRs
are not staple articles of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.' 10
"Staple article of commerce" is most easilydefined in a negative
manner. A "nonstaple" article is one that has no commercial use
except in connection with a patented method or combination."'
To form the basis for contributory infringement, the nonstaple
article must almost be uniquely suited to use in the patented invention." 2 Articles which can be used in noninfringing ways, but
only less safely" 3 or in a manner inconsistent with their design, 1 4
have been held to be nonstaple articles. To be a staple article of
commerce, a product must be suitable for substantial noninfringing uses. Such uses must not be far-fetched or illusory, but rather
5
customary and intended."
Taken as a whole, Betamax VCRs, with recorder and tuner
combined in one unit, are almost uniquely adapted to taping programs off the air. The tuner receives the broadcast signals and
translates them into a form which the recorder portion can record.
Without the tuner, the recorder could not record programs off the
air, while without the recorder, the tuner would be useless to make
copies of televised programs. The most conspicuous use of the
combination is to record programs off the air. That some television
programming is not copyrighted and that Betamax VCRs may be
used to tape noncopyrighted programs do not render VCRs suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 6 Use of the VCR in a
noninfringing manner by taping noncopyrighted programs would

108.
109.

Id. at 465, 468.
659 F.2d at 975.

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
1979).
115.
116.

Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 184 (1980).
P. ROSENBERG, supra note 88, at § 17.02.
Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc. v. Bil-Jax, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 577,581 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 428 (S.D.N.Y.
Spee-Flo Mfg. Corp. v. Gray Co., 255 F. Supp. 618,620 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
659 F.2d at 975; see M. NIMMER, supra note 37, at § 12.04 [A].
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occur merely by chance, if the user happened to select a noncopyrighted program to tape; whether a program is copyrighted is usually not a factor in the user's selection.
Patent case law does not indicate whether uses of less than the
whole product may be counted among the noninfringing uses in
determining whether the product is a staple article of commerce.
Neither Betamax court considered whether uses of only part of the
article are relevant to the determination, and neither court considered all of the VCR's noninfringing uses.
VCRs are capable, without modification, of noninfringing uses
which are not far-fetched or illusory, but rather are customary,
intended, and advertised. VCRs may be used to record live action
through a camera and to play pre-recorded tapes. 117 When a VCR
is so used, the tuner section of the machine is not used, however.
Arguably, Sony could sell VCRs without tuners (and consequently
without a substantial amount of their present appeal) if it wanted
to avoid liability for materially contributing to copyright infringement.
Thus, on the one hand, VCRs with integral tuners are especially
adapted to recording programs off the air, and to infringing, but
they are not uniquely adapted to such use. One of the major attractions of VCRs is their ability to record television programs; they
are intended to be used to do so, although they have other customary and intended uses. It may be wholly frivolous to argue that
such uses constitute substantial noninfringing uses, when the only
use which employs the article in its entirety is the infringing use.
Indeed, Sony could, and does, sell VCRs without the tuner which
are suitable almost only for the noninfringing uses.
On the other hand, the noninfringing uses constitute two out of
three of the customary uses. Betamax VCRs do not, by their own
nature, compel the user to use them to infringe. Thus, the alternative noninfringing uses are arguably substantial enough to render
Betamax VCRs staple articles of commerce, and Sony's contribution would then not be material.
Although the patent law concept of a staple article of commerce
offers some guidance on what constitutes material contribution

117. Although surveys show that the majority of VCR use is for time shifting, they also
show that rental of prerecorded tapes is substantial. The average "VCR household" rents 20
tapes per year. Saved by the Numbers, supra note 2, at 58. Sales of cameras are also
substantial. RCA, for example, expects to sell 500,000 videocameras in 1982. Daily Variety,
Jan. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
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when the contributory infringer provides the apparatus for making infringing copies, the definition of a staple article of commerce
is not clear enough to determine whether Betamax VCRs are staple articles of commerce. Thus, whether Sony's contribution to
copyright infringement is material cannot be determined solely by
resort to prior case law.
CONCLUSION

The Betamax case is a novel case. It presents facts quite different from all previous cases of contributory copyright infringement.
One fact, however, is particularly significant. Sony only had contact with the direct infringers through a marketplace distribution
chain. In all previous cases the direct and contributory infringers
had direct contact and a substantial relationship. The absence of
such a relationship takes the case outside of the rule of liability
created by the precedents, and finding Sony liable in this absence
would thereby expand the doctrine of contributory copyright
infringement.
In applying the Gershwin Publishingdefinition of contributory
infringement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made no reference to the relationship between direct and contributory infringer
that was present in all prior cases. The definition itself does not
take into account the relationship. Because the Betamax case
presents novel circumstances, it may have been necessary to apply
just the definition and not reason from past cases. The decision to
do so, however, involves two policy decisions-first, that liability
should not be limited to situations similar to those in previous
cases, and second, that liability should extend to a party in Sony's
position.
The conclusion that Sony was liable for contributory infringement does not flow inevitably from an application of settled rules.
While it is clear that the knowledge requirement for liability was
satisfied because Sony knew how Betamax VCRs would be and
were used, whether Sony induced or materially contributed to
infringement is far from clear. The standards are not defined
sharply enough to mandate a decision one way or the other, and
arguments can be made to support both sides. To reach a decision
on Sony's liability required a choice between the policies underlying the free flow of commerce on the one hand and copyright
protection on the other.
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The Ninth Circuit chose to favor copyright protection over commerce, Universal's and Disney's rights to their programs over the
market for VCRs. A possible result of the choice is that manufacturers might not introduce new products in the future lest they find
themselves saddled with liability for contributory infringement
due to their awareness that these products had infringing uses.
The choice had to be made to decide the case, but the policy decisions behind the choice should not have been hidden behind a
sparsely reasoned application of a nebulous definition.
THOMAS J. BRANIT

